Remembering C.K. Daphtary - India's first Solicitor General

“The boy who wrote the best essay got the first prize”. Many of us would have come across this anecdote, where Chander Kishan Daphtary, India’s first Solicitor General, perfectly summarized the Indira Gandhi government’s decision to appoint Justice A.N. Ray as Chief Justice of India, by superseding 3 of the senior-most judges of the Supreme Court (Justices Shelat, Grover and Hegde). [A.N. Ray was rewarded for his ‘essays’, after he held in favor of the Government in the Keshavananda Bharathi case, and was also the only judge who upheld Indira Gandhi’s bank nationalization ordinance of 1969].

This is just one among the many sharp and memorable anecdotes from Daphtary’s career, where he served as independent India’s first Solicitor General (from 1950-1963), and succeeded M.C. Setalvad to serve as India’s second Attorney General from 1963-1968. After serving as Attorney General, he was also nominated to the Rajya Sabha in 1972. In fact, his one-line description of Justice A.N. Ray getting the ‘first prize’ for his ‘essay’ was made in the Rajya Sabha itself!

C.K. Daphtary, who was fondly known as Chandubhai, is still remembered for his sharp and witty one-liners in Court. Perhaps the most ‘savage’ of all his one-liners was when Daphtary was practicing in the Bombay High Court. Daphtary was appearing before a Bench headed by Justice Somjee, on a matter relating to stock exchange transactions. It was also well-known that Daphtary himself regularly dabbled in stocks.

Justice Somjee had refused to grant Daphtary permission to continue cross-examining a witness regarding a stock exchange transaction he had undertaken. When Daphtary persisted, Justice Somjee had remarked – ““Mr Daphtary, you will of course know all about stock exchange transactions”.

Daphtary did not react. A few moments later, a law report had to be passed by him to the Bench. As soon as the book was handed over, Justice Somjee remarked – “Mr. Daphtary, there is a bug in this book”. Daphtary immediately seized the opportunity and said – “My Lord, it is not the first time that a bug has travelled from the Bar to the Bench”. This was a sly remark at Justice Somjee himself, who had been elevated as a Judge from the Bar.

While there are many more witty anecdotes and one-liners, Mr. Daphtary’s memory lasts beyond his sharpness and sense of humour. He was also a man who stood by principles, some of which are relevant even today. Three such incidents from Daphtary’s journey bear utmost relevance even today.

A stern request asking Chief Justice Gajendragadkar to recuse

In 1965, two matters dealing with a cooperative housing society came before a Bench headed by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar. A bunch of intervenors from Bombay argued that Chief Justice Gajendragadkar should recuse himself, as he was a member of one of the cooperative housing societies, for which the Government of Bombay had acquired land. Initially, Justice Gajendragadkar stated that he would recuse himself only from one out of two matters, where he had an indirect interest. But, this was objected to C.K. Daphtary, who was then the Attorney General.

Daphtary categorically stated that Chief Justice Gajendragadkar should recuse himself from both matters, as he had a common indirect interest in them. The Bench was reconstituted the next day, and Justice Subba Rao was asked to preside. As Fali Nariman points out in his autobiography, Before Memory Fades, Daphtary stood up for principle and asked for Chief Justice Gajendragadkar’s recusal - even though there was a strong belief in the Bar that Chief Justice Gajendragadkar would decide in favor of the State, as his views on the legal questions involved were well-known.

Daphtary’s role in the constitution of the ADM Jabalpur bench

Daphtary also had an important role to play in the constitution of the bench that decided the ADM Jabalpur case in 1976, during the emergency. After Indira Gandhi’s proclamation of a national emergency in 1975, a number of political leaders and activists had been arrested under the infamous MISA – Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.

Different High Courts had taken contrary views on whether fundamental rights (including the right to life under Article 21) can be suspended when a national emergency was declared. This was crucial, as if fundamental rights stood suspended during an emergency, anyone who had been detained would have no right to challenge his detention before the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

As 9 High Courts had held against the Indira Gandhi Government, the Government filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. There was a growing suspicion in the Supreme Court Bar that Chief Justice A.N. Ray (the boy who wrote the best essay and got the first prize) would constitute a bench of judges who would without doubt give their decision in favor of the Government. Daphtary, who was then the President of the Bar Association, approached Chief Justice Ray and suggested that as there was some concern in the Supreme Court Bar, a bench consisting of the 5 senior-most judges of the Supreme Court should be constituted.

Chief Justice Ray retorted - and asked whether there was ever an occasion where suggestions were made to the Chief Justice of India regarding whom to put on a bench. Daphtary was quick to the task, and responded that he does recall a previous occasion where Chief Justice S.R. Das was told about concerns regarding the composition of a bench, and S.R. Das never took it in the wrong spirit.

This struck the right nerve with CJI A.N. Ray, as S.R. Das happened to be his mentor! CJI A.N. Ray then went on to constitute a Bench with the 5 senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. However, Daphtary’s efforts obviously went in vain, as 4 out of 5 judges held in favor of the Government.

It was only Justice H.R. Khanna who dissented and held that even during a national emergency, fundamental rights cannot be suspended. This ‘essay’ also cost him the post of Chief Justice of India, as the Government superseded him and appointed Justice Beg. In an era where serious questions have been raised regarding composition of benches and assignment of politically sensitive cases to certain judges, even A.N. Ray’s reluctant approval of Daphtary’s request seems to look bright.

Daphtary’s views on the UAPA

Daphtary’s views on the UAPA are most relevant today, when the law is being used to muzzle political dissent. In October 1967, a Joint Parliamentary Committee was set-up to examine the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Bill, 1967 (UAPA). This was the original draft of the UAPA, which did not deal with terrorist activities, and only penalized ‘unlawful activities’ that affected India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. As Daphtary was the Attorney General, he was asked to depose before the Joint Parliamentary Committee.

Taking into account the overbroad definition of ‘unlawful activity’ that could be penalised, Daphtary noted that “these are drastic powers”, and that “the law was going as far as one could go”. In his view, the UAPA Bill was constitutional, but not ‘perfectly constitutional’. He also stated that while we may assume that powers granted by the UAPA would be exercised honestly and properly, we cannot say whether that shall always be the case.

Although Daphtary was to a certain extent ambiguous in his opinion, he has been proven correct in hindsight – as the UAPA today is only used against activists and protesters, who disagree with the ruling establishment. Even though the UAPA has been substantially amended since 1967 and terrorist activities have also been brought within its ambit, Daphtary’s views highlight how the law always had the potential to be misused – in the manner that we are witnessing today.

Along with his sharpness and wit, Daphary’s commitment towards rights and freedoms was also steadfast. In June 1975, after Indira Gandhi imposed the emergency, Daphtary was pained to see how High Court judges who decided against the Government were arbitrarily transferred. He told Fali Nariman – “Fali, what we need now is a Subba Rao”.

In fact, Fali Nariman has stated in his autobiography that the most important advice he ever received was from Daphtary, who told him – “Always remember, Fali, it is better to spend more time thinking about a case than merely reading the brief”. All of his words and actions continue to stand the test of time.

The denial of bail to Safoora Zargar – Is our criminal justice system no longer humane?

“The significance and sweep of Art. 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern, and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Art. 19.... Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose, but for the bi-focal interests of justice - to the individual involved and society affected……..Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law”.

-         Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in Babu Singh v State of UP, AIR 1978 SC 527

On 4^th June, the Patiala House Court refused to grant bail to Safoora Zargar – who is in the 21^st week of her pregnancy. Safoora was booked under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (the UAPA) for allegedly ‘instigating’ the East Delhi riots, which took place in the last week of February. The charge against Safoora was framed for committing the offence mentioned in sub-section (iii) of Section 2(o) of the UAPA, which deals with the commission of an ‘unlawful activity’ that causes or is intended to cause ‘disaffection’ against India. Now, under clause (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA, for offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the statute, bail cannot be granted when the Court is of the view that a prima facie case has been made out by the prosecution.

Chapter IV deals with the commission of a terrorist act, while Chapter VI deals with offences relating to membership of a terrorist organization. The statute forbids the Court from granting bail only when a prima facie case is made out for offences that fall under Chapter IV and Chapter VI. This does not apply for other offences, such as the offence of causing (or attempting to cause) disaffection against India, which Safoora has been accused of. For such other offences, the existing jurisprudence on bail shall be applicable. The bail order fails to note this distinction, and only examines whether there is prima facie merit in the charges made against Safoora.

Existence of a prima facie case against the accused is only one among the many factors that the Court is mandated to take into consideration, while deciding whether bail is to be granted. As the Supreme Court has noted in decisions such as State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat and Prasantha Kumar v. Ashis Chatterjee, there are multiple other factors that the Court has to take into account while considering a bail application. Some of these factors are  – (i) the nature of accusations and the severity of punishment in case of conviction; (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering of evidence/ influencing of witnesses; (iii) reasonable apprehension of threat to the complainant; and (iv) danger of the accused absconding. The Court failed to consider any of these factors, and only determined whether there is prima facie merit in the charges framed.

Let us apply some of the factors mentioned above to Safoora’s case. The charge framed against Safoora under the UAPA is for causing disaffection against India, which is a charge framed by the prosecution in most instances where there are fervent protests against the establishment. As per the bail order, the overt act through which ‘disaffection against India’ is caused is the attempt to block a road. Now, this is an overbroad interpretation of the ambit of the term ‘disaffection’, especially in a scenario where there is no concrete material to support the claim that Safoora incited violence. In any event, Safoora is not accused of a heinous crime such as murder, or attempt to commit murder. 

As the police already claims to have documentary evidence (such as Whatsapp chats) and video footage of the alleged actions of Safoora, there is no possibility of any large-scale destruction of evidence or influencing of witnesses. There also exists no reasonable apprehension of Safoora absconding. Even without considering the aspect of pregnancy, there were other grounds on which the Court could have granted bail. The Court does not even refer to these grounds which it ought to have considered under well-established bail jurisprudence. Granting of bail in any case would not have affected the veracity's of the charges framed by the prosecution, which shall be determined only at the trial stage. 

Let us now come to the Court’s approach to the defence counsel’s claim that bail should be granted on humanitarian grounds, as Safoora was in the 21^st week of her pregnancy. Safoora was also reported to be suffering from poly cystic ovarian disorder, and had a reported history of urinary tract infection. The defence counsel also highlighted that all the three jails in Delhi have reported positive cases of Covid-19, and her situation becomes all the more vulnerable in this pandemic. The Court fails to even address these contentions in its order, and attempts to salvage the situation by ‘requesting’ the jail superintendent to provide medical aid and assistance to Safoora. However, even if medical aid were to be provided from time to time – that is not in any way a justification for denying bail to a pregnant woman.

This is because pregnancy is a process that is physically and psychologically draining, where access to a clean, hygienic and conducive environment is crucial. A jail cell obviously cannot provide a conducive environment. This, along with the lack of hygiene, may increase the chances of catching Covid-19, as well as other infections - which may lead to complications in the pregnancy. The inability to ensure effective social distancing in jails only exacerbates the problem – and increases the risk of contracting the coronavirus. The Court failed to take note of these health risks which a pregnant woman may have to face in jail. 

This failure to secure Safoora’s personal liberty and right to health under Article 21 is nothing short of callous and inhumane.  As Justice Krishna Iyer held in Babu Singh’s case, public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law, as depriving bail may amount to an unreasonable deprivation of ‘life and personal liberty’ under Article 21. One does not need to be a lawyer or a law student to figure that keeping a pregnant woman in jail poses a risk to her life and her health. If a pregnant woman who is subjected to vague charges of ‘blocking a road’ cannot be granted bail, then we must ask ourselves the question – Is our criminal justice system no longer humane? Let us all be the judge.

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Update: On 24th June, Safoora Zargar was finally granted bail by the Delhi HC. Solicitor General Tushar Metha, who was representing the Delhi Police before the HC, stated that he shall not be opposing the bail plea on humanitarian grounds. 

As we debate larger questions surrounding the UAPA, Safoora Zargar's case serves as an epitome of the manner in which this law denigrates civil liberties, and suppresses all forms of dissent against the State.