Ever
since the nationwide lockdown was imposed on 25th March, we have
come across heart-wrenching reports of the sufferings of migrant workers, daily
wage laborers and other sections of the population - who lack access to means of
livelihood till this lockdown prevails. This has led to multiple discussions on
the manner in which the State should provide them access to basic resources, so
that they can sustain themselves during the continuance of the lockdown.
Two of
the biggest challenges that migrant workers, daily wage earners etc. have faced
in this lockdown are: (i) lack of access to sufficient quantity of food; and (ii) lack of access to financial resources - in a situation where they may not be able
to earn wages, or have lost their only source of income. Policy experts
have persuasively argued
that in this situation, it is the State’s duty to ensure that the deprived
sections of society have access to food and social security. There has however
not been sufficient discussion on the nature of this duty, which is to be fulfilled
by the State.
Now,
right to food and social security are undoubtedly socio-economic rights that
fall within the penumbra of rights that have been read into Article 21 of the
Constitution. Reading Article 21 in consonance with international human rights
law principles, I shall in this post
argue that the State has a constitutional obligation to secure access to
- (i) a basic level of nutrition, by providing a certain minimum quantity of
food; and (ii) a basic level of cash or sustenance income, for those who cannot
earn wages and are bound to lose their means of livelihood during the lockdown.
The
corollary between rights and duties
Every
right imposes both positive and negative obligations on the State. The negative
obligation requires the State to refrain from infringing that right. The
positive obligation on the other hand requires the State to secure access to
that particular right, by framing requisite schemes and policies. For instance,
with respect to the right to food, the State has a negative obligation to
ensure that it does not discriminate between citizens while granting food
rations. The State also has a positive obligation to ensure that the deprived
sections of society have adequate access to food. This obligation of securing
access to food requires the State to spend financial resources, and also draw
up an effective policy to achieve the same. During a situation of a lockdown,
the obligation on the State is positive in nature – to ensure that underprivileged
sections of society are not deprived of food or basic social security.
Now, the
State may not have the financial means to immediately secure access to a certain
quantity of food and thereby a minimum level of nutrition. Similarly, the State
may not have the resources to provide access to a minimum level of income to
those who have lost their means of livelihood during the lockdown. Hence, the
question that arises here is – What is the scope and ambit of the State’s
positive obligation to secure access to food and social security, during this
pandemic? This is where the principles laid down in the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) come in handy.
General Comment No.3
of the ICESCR talks about a ‘minimum core’ obligation – which means that
the minimum essential levels of each of the rights recognized by the Covenant should
be immediately realized by the State. Aspects of the right which do not form
part of the minimum core should be progressively realized by the State –
based on availability of financial resources. In other words, States should immediately
secure access to those aspects of a right that forms part of the minimum core. This
can be illustrated by referring to the example mentioned in the General Comment
itself, which is as follows. If in a particular State, a number of individuals
are deprived of essential foodstuffs, then that State party is failing to fulfil
its minimum core obligation under the ICESCR.
The
minimum core obligation is designed to ensure that deprived sections of society
have access to a minimum level of resources, through which they can live with
dignity. What aspects of a particular right constitute the ‘minimum core’ may
also vary based on the prevailing circumstances. Different countries have
however adopted different approaches in the past, while elucidating the scope of
the minimum core obligation. Courts have especially found it difficult to
define the content of the ‘minimum core’ of a right. The approaches adopted by Courts
in South Africa, Argentina and India shall be discussed below.
Differences
approaches adopted by Courts to define the ‘minimum core’ obligation
South
Africa:
In
decisions such as Grootboom
and Treatment
Action Campaign, the South African Constitutional Court has held that
minimum core is not an independent enforceable standard in itself, and that it
can only be used to examine the reasonableness of the measures adopted by the Government.
In Mazibuko v.
City of Johanesburg, it was contended that a minimum quantity of 50
litres of water should be provided to every household, in accordance with Section
27 of the South African Constitution,
which prescribed a right to access sufficient water. The appellants fixed 50
litres as the minimum threshold of water to be provided based on expert
evidence.
The South
African Constitutional Court held that Section 27 of the Constitution does not
confer the right to claim sufficient water immediately. It held that a minimum
quantity of water cannot be prescribed by the Court, and that the Court should
only determine whether reasonable measures are being taken to progressively
achieve the right of access to sufficient water. This decision has however been
criticized by scholars such as David Bilchitz, who have argued that this approach
conflates the distinction between a right and a duty. Such an approach of not
spelling out the content of the right may also adversely affect the vulnerable
sections of society.
Argentina:
In the Miguel
Angel case, where the fact situation that was similar to Mazibuko,
the Court spelt out the minimum content of the right to water by referring to
the Argentinian Constitution and other provincial regulations. This approach of
spelling out the content of the minimum core of the right in question is better
than the approach adopted in Mazibuko - as spelling out the content gives clarity
regarding the State’s obligation to enforce the right, which may work to the benefit
of the deprived sections.
India:
The
Indian Courts have imposed a minimum core obligation in certain situations,
such as while examining the scope of right to health under Article 21. In Mohd Ahmed v. Union of India
(Delhi HC) and Manoj v.
State of Kerala (Kerala HC), the Courts have held that the right to health
under Article 21 imposes a minimum core obligation of providing access to
life-saving drugs, especially to the deprived sections of society. Specifically in Mohd Ahmed, the Indian Courts held that for obligations that fall within the
ambit of the minimum core, a paucity of financial resources is not an excuse.
Indian Courts have hence imposed a non-derogable minimum core obligation for
certain aspects of the right to health.
In my
view, this approach is better than the one
adopted by the South African Constitutional Court for two reasons. First,
it aims to define the minimum content of the right, by taking into account the
basic essential levels of the right in question - which is necessary for a
person to live a life with dignity. This imposes a specific obligation that the
State has to fulfil, to secure access to this right. Second, while
defining this minimum core obligation, the approach places specific emphasis on
meeting the needs of deprived sections of society.
Applying
this ‘minimum core’ standard during a nationwide lockdown
Let us take
forward the ‘minimum core’ standard applied in Mohd Ahmed and Manoj
to the situation of nationwide lockdown, which exists as of today. Now, if we consider
the basic essential levels of the right to food and the right to social security
that is necessary in this situation for deprived sections of society to live a
life with dignity, there can only be one common end. During a nationwide
lockdown, providing a minimum basic level of food (and thereby ensuring basic
levels of nutrition) and basic sustenance income to deprived sections of the
population who have lost their means of livelihood can be considered as components
of the ‘minimum core’ of the right to food and the right to social security.
The State
hence has a constitutional obligation to secure access to the minimum levels of
each of these rights. Now, with respect to the right to food, this would mean
providing a certain minimum quantity of foodgrain, along with other commodities
such as cooking oil and pulses – to the deprived sections of society who may
have lost their only source of income. While framing this minimum quantity, the
parameter should be to secure access to a minimum essential level of nutrition
that is necessary for deprived sections of society to live with dignity.
While
the modalities of framing this minimum quantity falls within the domain of the
executive, the constitutional benchmark imposed by the minimum core obligation
should be satisfied. Similarly, with respect to social security for the
deprived sections of the population, the constitutional benchmark shall be for
the State to provide a basic level of cash or sustenance income, that shall be in
consonance with the income otherwise earned by such individuals. Providing such a basic sustenance income along with basic levels of nutrition is integral for migrant workers and laborers to live with dignity.
Meeting
this minimum core obligation also serves as an answer to the debate that we are
having in India today - on saving lives (through enforcing a lockdown) v.
ensuring livelihood (by relaxing the lockdown measures and permitting economic
activity). While saving lives v. ensuring livelihoods is being seen as a binary
and a trade-off, it is definitely possible for us to fulfill both these goals
simultaneously. This can be done by meeting the minimum core obligations
discussed above – through which those who have lost their livelihood get access
to food and basic sustenance income, even during the prevalence of the lockdown.
Fulfilling the minimum core can hence ensure that safeguarding health does not
come at the cost of destroying livelihood, and vice versa.
While
many State Governments are providing food and cash to migrant workers, daily
wage earners etc, a lot more needs to be done to ensure that similarly
placed individuals are not excluded from such schemes. Until this is done, the constitutional
duties imposed by the ‘minimum core’ aspects of the right to food and social
security shall not be enforced in letter and in spirit.
(This
is our second post highlighting certain constitutional aspects of the nationwide
lockdown and the Covid-19 pandemic. In the next post relating to Covid-19, we shall
deal with the right to privacy, and whether it should necessarily be ‘traded-off’
in favor of public health.)
Hi - great job. Just one comment, a corollary between the South African decisions and the Indian decisions will not flow, because the SA constitution has an imbibed article for right to health which imposes limitations on the state's obligations.
ReplyDeleteHi Naman! Yes, thanks for pointing that out! Was just checking the provision in the SA constitution, which also says emergency medical treatment should be provided - which is something that Indian courts have also read into Article 21.
DeleteThank you for pointing this out :)